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CONFRONTING UNCERTAINTY IN CHILD
ABUSE ADJUDICATION: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS OF THEORIES OF THE
JUDICIAL ROLE IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY
LAURENCE W.

COHEN*

Throughout history scholars have attempted to defend myriad conceptions of the judicial role. For instance, Corwin believed that law, embodied in nature, was to be discovered by judges.1 Cardozo also
envisioned an active judiciary, responsible for keeping law consistent
with the mores of the day. 2 Wigmore, on the other hand, felt that personalizing justice through judicial discretion is the "antithesis of the Anglo-Saxon conception of justice."' 3 Rather, justice, if attainable at all,
4
must be achieved through strict rule application.
Whereas 19th-century scholarship focused on formal rules, recent
authorities have turned to contemplating how legal decisions are made
and the impact of those decisions on the behavior of groups and individuals.' Today society is changing so fast that strict rules, rigid by nature
and subject to inertia, cannot keep up with values in flux. Two recent
theories 6 responding to this phenomenon call for an active judiciary to
help recognize and refashion rules which have become outdated. This
* J.D., Harvard, 1981.
Editor's note: This article was written in 1981 and last updated in 1982.
I

E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1928).
2 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 135-141 (1921).
3 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 382-383 (1949).
4 Id.

5 Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretationof Written Documents, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 751,
(1965). Much of the commentary in this area stems from the belief that judges use rhetoric to justify
previously made decisions. See, e.g., W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964);
Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1980),
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935);
Letter from Jerome Frank to Felix Frankfurter (December 2, 1935) (Frankfurter Papers in the Library of Congress) ("I am convinced that particular cases are won by appealing to the peculiar
attitudes of the particular judges by whom those particular cases are determined.") Cf.K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 190-191 (1960) ("The court is not merely reaching for authority or color to justify the decision in hand, but is also seeking and finding comfort in the conviction
that the decision and the rule announced fit with the feel of the body of our law.
...
) Others look
at institutional interferences with decision-making. See, e.g., Auerbach, Welcome to Litigation, New
Republic, January 17, 1981, at 19-21 (Extreme views by adversaries force judges to a middle ground.
"Adversary proceedings are to truth-finding what spinach is to muscles: unrelated.")
6 Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARVARD CIV. RJGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 269 (1975); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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article tests those theories in the context of child abuse adjudication, 7 and
questions the legitimacy of using increased judicial activity to identify
fundamental values.
I have chosen child abuse and neglect as a frame of reference primarily because the disagreement within the field offers a paradigm of
values in flux. These changing values appear on three levels:
1) the changing views on male and female roles and what constitutes a family;
2) the lack of consensus on what is the best method of child rearing, what constitutes parental unfitness, and what are the consequences of various alternative living arrangements on a
child's development; and
3) the orientation of the judicial system to act-oriented disputes,
such as bar room brawls and auto accidents, as opposed to
analysis of interpersonal relationships.
Moreover, the intimate setting of the family provides a framework
for questioning the assumption that economic utility is a sound measurement of general social welfare. 8 Perhaps, more than any other phenomena, violence towards children evokes a strong and universal reaction.
More subtle, however, is the ambivalent nature of that reaction.
Shared notions of parental love and care are deeply offended by a
parent who appears not to want his child. The public is puzzled
by the parent who loves his child but nevertheless intentionally
harms him or fails to protect the child from harm. Public outrage
has led the state to intervene in dangerous family situations to
guarantee the child's safety. However, American society regards
the relationship between parent and child as so precious and so
beneficial to the child's growth that the family is protected against
all unnecessary state intervention. The specter of unjustified state
intrusion into or destruction of this relationship affronts fundamental notions of parenthood. 9
7 In this paper I use the terms "child abuse", and "abuse and neglect", and "care and protection" interchangably. They are intended to encompass all potential situations in which the state
might contemplate removing a child from the home because the parents fail to provide an adequate
environment.
8 Most authorities who have studied adjudication have done so within a system where economic
utility is the ultimate goal. Thus, individual wants may be sacrificed to enhance social welfare. But,
no person should consent to constructing an adjudicatory process for child abuse cases which would
achieve generally acceptable results at the expense of a single child's life. Thus, by testing a theory in
the context of its treatment of children the system will receive the strictest of tests; it will not be
approved if it elevates systematic goals over the needs of the individuals involved.
9 See generally Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Towards Abuse and Neglect of Children: A
Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. REv.645, 660 (1980). "In 1978, over
one-half million families were reported to state agencies under abuse reporting laws. Many more
families come under agency supervision without any report. Over one hundred thousand families
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There is no question that child abuse and neglect must stop. The
problem, however, is that there is no consensus on the role the state
should assume in achieving this result. If the state were always right, or
if abuse and neglect were easy to define and detect, then there would be
no discussion. But that is not the case and the stakes of error are high.
An example of the risks endemic in ad hoc state intervention is Roe v.
Conn. 10 In that case a white woman was adjudicated unfit simply because she and her four-year-old son were living with a black man in a
black neighborhood, and she was single and unemployed. There was no
evidence of child abuse. 1
In recent years, child abuse and neglect policy has been a major
topic arousing criticism and demands for reform.' 2 Along with a changing emphasis from punishment of abusers to their rehabilitation, has been
the continuing debate over the need to intervene and over the failure of
13
the legal system to create a fair and workable system for intervention.
Courts are guided by abuse and neglect statutes,' 4 generally written
in broad and vague terms which allow wide judicial discretion. 5 Most
states follow a "best interests of the child" standard but, "few states have
special additional statutory requirements that must be met before removal of a child over whom the court has jurisdiction, and none of these
16
requires very specific determinations."
The mechanism for discovering cases of child abuse lies in a complex social welfare bureaucracy free of strict or well-developed legislative
restraints.' 7 Furthermore, courts place little control over active agency
intervention as the judicial process is often employed merely as a legal
imprimatur of agency decisions. 18
Frequently a court will order removal of a child from the home and
are involved in abuse and neglect court cases each year, and over 30,000 children are removed from
their homes by court or agency action." (Footnotes omitted).
10 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Phillips, King Solomon's Court: Reconciling the Interests
of Parent, Child and State Under Mas.a Gen. Laws Ch. 119, 15 NEw ENG. 853, (1980).
11417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
12Bourne and Newberger, "FamilyAutonomy" or "Coercive Intervention"? Ambiguity and Conflict in the Proposed Standardsfor Child Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U. L. REv. 670, (1977).
13See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 986 (1975); Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath and Sawitsky, Legal Research
on Child Abuse and Neglect: Past and Future, 11 FAM. L.Q. 151, 152 (1977).

14Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath and Sawitsky, supra note 13, at 152.
15See generally,Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Scope of State Child Neglect Statutes, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 719, (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, ConstitutionalLimitations]; Mnookin, Child
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRODS. 226, 240 (Summer, 1975).
16 Wald, supra note 9, at 660; Mnookin, supra note 15 at 240-241.
17 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 243 n.81.
Is Custody of a Minor, 377 Mass. 876, 389 N.E.2d 68 (1979).
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placement in a foster home or in an institution.' 9 The court may, alternatively, order in-home supervision, counselling or other services. 20 Once
the child has been removed the natural parents may be challenged for
21
custody by the welfare agency or the foster home.
Much of the commentary on the faults of our present care and protection system concerns the propriety of the traditional adversarial setting and the competence of judges to decide the issues. 22 The uncertainty
and indeterminacy inherent in care and protection cases adds profound
complications to the effort to formulate workable judicial standards in
this area. 2 3 First, since there is little agreement on what terms like
"abuse" and "neglect" mean, 24 we have no mechanism to provide advance warning to parents or guidance to judges. Because of vague laws,
judges may assume wide discretion; hence will remain unaccountable.
This grants judges the power to invade family autonomy at will, and
25
subject it to the judge's personal values.
Second, irrespective of the level of care parents should provide, our
society lacks settled views on many characteristics of the family.
Although most sex-based classifications are slowly disappearing, there is
still abundant controversy and moral flux regarding such issues as homo26
sexual parents and extended families.
Finally, almost every aspect of what is in the best interests of a child
lacks consensus. "We really know very little about how to raise a child
19See generally Mnookin, supra note 15, at 243.
20 Id.

21 See also MINoW, THE JUDGMENT OF SOLOMON AND THE EXPERIENCE OF JUSTICE (1979),

reprinted in R. COVER AND 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 447 (1979) (suggesting completely individualized and discretionary hearings before an omnipotent judge in private-dispute-custody cases).
22 See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-769, (1982) ("The psychiatric evidence
ordinarily adduced at commitment proceedings is rarely susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . Like civil commitment hearings, termination (of parental rights) proceedings often require the factfinder to evaluate medical and psychiatric testimony, and to decide issues difficult to
prove to a level of absolute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection between
parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and progress.")
23 Note, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 15, at 732-733; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD AND A.

SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 16 (1979).
24 J. Goldstein, A. Freud, and A. Solnit, supra note 23, at 16-17.
25 Id. at 139-144. By extended families I mean families other than parent/child home situations.
See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (grandmother living with two grandsons who were
cousins constitutes a family). The question is how far this will extend in the future.
26 In custody most sex-based presumptions have been eliminated from the statutes. See also,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating on due process and equal protection grounds a
statute that conclusively presumed unwed fathers to be unfit to care for their children). But cf
Ellsworth and Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, An Effort to Rely on Social
Sciences Data in FormulatingLegal Policies, 4 LAW AND Soc'y REV. 167, 202-203 (1969) (as recently as 1969 authorities argued for legal presumptions in favor of mothers in custody cases).
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to make him 'healthy'-however 'healthy' may be defined". 27 Robert H.
Mnookin's landmark article, Child Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face of Indeterminacy,28 states that determining what is in a
child's best interests is speculative and indeterminate since psychological
theories are not adequately predictive of the effects of alternative custody
arrangements on children. Even if good predictions were available, society has no consensus on what values are to be used in determining best
29
interests.
Cultural biases, religious beliefs, and socio-economic differences add
yet more dimensions of uncertainty to child neglect cases. 30 Judges, social workers, and other members of society have preconceived notions of
what is right and wrong. In cases where we are usually not looking at
specific acts but are subjectively evaluating personalities and human relationships, there is an overwhelming tendency for us to impose our own
values in judging others.3 ' When this tendency is coupled with the urge
to intervene on behalf of a helpless abused child, there exists the substantial risk of arbitrary intervention into the family sphere by judges and
social workers, who are not circumscribed by rules.
The danger stemming from the fact that judges and social workers
are likely to impose their personal values when judging the child rearing
practices of parents is heightened by the prevalence of poverty in families
subject to intervention for neglect.3 2 Even when the ability to parent is of
the highest caliber, economic disadvantages can have an extremely detrimental effect on child development. Thus it is very easy to misread the
27 Wald, supra note 13, at 992.
28 See note 15 supra.

29 Id. at229. There is scant information on "how children are likely to fare under alternative
custody arrangements," Ellsworth and Levy, supra note 26, at 215.
30 For example, a 1958 report concluded that working-class parents are more likely to use physical punishment while middle-class families will resort to reasoning and guilt. Also, a 1974 study
found that accepted methods of discipline in Nigeria were found to be excessive by parents surveyed
in New York. Areen, Intervention Between Parent & Child: A Reappraisalof the State's Role in
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 at 923 n.188 (1975).
31 See Chamberlain, Abuse and Neglect: FederalProposals--PerpetuatingUncertainty, 36 Briefcase 123, 124 (1979).
32 "From the standpoint of natural parents, such as the appellant intervenors here, foster care
has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of the poor." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1977). Accord, Chamberlain,
supra note 31, at 124 ("Added to this is the fact that most 'clients' or recipients of the 'services' are
individuals or families in the lower economic strata of society (the rich have other resources), and
that the 'practitioners' generally derive from the middle class and are steeped in the traditions
thereof, with certain built-in biases against their own clients."). For national statistics see Areen,
supra note 30, at 889 n.23; McCathren, Accountability in the Child Protection System: A Defense of
the Proposed StandardsRelating to Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U. L. REv. 707, 711 n.16 (1977).
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characteristics of poverty as the results of neglect. 33 Child abuse occurs
in families of all income levels. Yet, the families most likely to be the
social
subject of state intervention are poor. This suggests that cultural,
34
area.
this
in
agencies
state
motivate
and racial prejudices
A summary of the atmosphere of uncertainty and indeterminacy
pervading child care and protection disputes presents a seemingly insurmountable dilemma for traditional forms of adjudication.
On the one hand, the very inability to make predictions about the
consequences of alternative custody dispositions and the lack of a
social consensus about the values that should inform child rearing
make the formulation of rules-by the court or the legislaturevery problematic at the present time. On the other hand, the use
of an indeterminate standard such as "best interests" raises fundamental questions of fairness, largely removes the special burden of
justification that is characteristic of adjudication, and involves the
use of the judicial process35in a way that is quite uncharacteristic of
traditional adjudication.
Legal training and expertise is inadequate preparation for understanding
the complexities of interpersonal relations, much less for drawing clear
lines for appropriate behavior and reasonable state intervention.
Yet, child abuse problems arise and we desperately need a mechanism for the fair and efficient resolution of each individual case.
II
A. Family Autonomy and State Intervention
Rules and procedures governing child abuse adjudication must reflect three primary sets of interests: those of the family, those of the
36
child, and those of the state.
1. Family
Freedom of personal choice in marriage and family has long been
regarded as a fundamental liberty interest and basic human right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 Ever
33 Wald, supra note 9, at 690 (suggesting that a lot of the money spent on detecting neglect
would be better spent improving economic conditions).
34 See Areen, supra note 30, at 888-889, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494,
508 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) "he Constitution cannot be interpreted, however, to tolerate
the imposition by government on the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family
living,"
35 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 292.
36 Areen, supra note 30, at 890.
37 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For
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a private
since Meyer v. Nebraska38 the Supreme Court has recognized
39
realm of family life that may not be entered by the state.
Since society's ideas about the family 4° and the independent rights
of its members 4 1 are constantly changing, the extent of the protection
afforded the family by the Constitution is difficult to specify. Nevertheless, we must attempt to ascertain the general ambit of those protections
in order to fashion a care and protection system that respects those fundamental rights.
The most comprehensive definition of "the family" was stated by
Justice Brennan in Smith v. Organizationof Foster Families For Equality
& Reform. 4 2 First, "family" implies a biological relationship and the
Supreme Court has stressed the rights of parents to conceive and raise
their children. Although blood relationship is not imperative, it is an
important factor.
Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
role it plays in "promoting a way of life" through the instruction
of children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972), as
43
well as from the fact of blood relationship.
In the same year the court recognized that "family" extends to beyond
parents and their children, and ruled that ordinances which limit the
definition of family abridge "the 'freedom of personal choices in matters
of. . .family life (which) is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842, 846-847 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431
U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
38262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842
(1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-153 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); id., at 495-496 (Goldberg, J.,concurring); id., at 502-503 (White, J.,concurring); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-544, 549-553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925).
40 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (grandmother living with two
non-fraternal grandsons is a family). Also, although the Court's involvement with family rights
continues to stress traditional concepts of the family, as different types of relationships, such as
homosexual marriages, become more and more public, they will eventually be recognized. Grey,
supra note 5, at 85, 97.
41 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right of unwed father not to be presumed unfit to
take care of his children). There is also increasing recognition of the constitutional rights of children. See, e.g., Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classification. and Conclusive Presumptions" Three
Linked Riddles, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8 (Summer 1975).
42 431 U.S. 816, 842-845 (1977).
43 Id., at 844.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'." 44
Western tradition accepts the presumption that parents are concerned with the nurturance of their children. 45 It is assumed that a parent's love and care will provide children with the necessary protection.
Therefore our law protects the sanctity of parental freedom in choosing
proper methods of upbringing."
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions.
More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children.
As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality
may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the incidence
of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this. That some parents
"may at times be acting against the interests of their children"
creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interests. The statist notion that
governmental power should supersede parental authority in all
cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repug47
nant to American tradition.
Some authorities support the proposition that a parent should be seen as
trustee for his children and thus answerable to a standard of good parenting. 4 8 Most authorities agree, however, that our commitment to diversity of lifestyles and thought 49 "is promoted by allowing families to raise
children in a wide variety of living situations and with diverse childrear" Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 507 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-649 (1974)).
41 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath and Sawitsky,
supra note 13, at 151; Areen, supra at note 30, at 891. "A natural parent's 'desire for the right "to
the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children" is an interest far more
precious than any property right." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-759 (1982), quoting
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
4 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-3 (1972) ("This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-5 (1925) ("the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control").
47 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-603 (1979) (citations omitted).
48 Wald, supra note 14, at 990.

49 See Wald, supra note 9, at 645; Wald, supra note 13, at 992.
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ing patterns. 50
2. Children
Although case law has consistently tied children's interests to those
of the family by recognizing "broad parental authority" 51 in the upbringing of minor children, society's view of the parent-child relationship has
evolved from one of total domination-based on a theory of propertyto one of a greater sensitivity to children's needs as human beings. 52 In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 3 the Supreme Court dispelled any notion that
children were "the mere creature of the State."
Recently, authorities have advocated the right of children to feel
wanted and loved by their parents, to have the opportunity to interact on
a day-to-day basis, to give and receive affection and express anger toward
members of their family, and to live and grow in a mature home environment so they can develop into mature adults. 54 Concurrent with these
developments has been a shift of emphasis from the fitness of the parent
to the best interests of the child in neglect proceedings,5 and a general
dissolution of "previously sharp rules" in favor of more general
principles.56
In his partial dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 57 Justice Douglas surveyed the cases that he believed established the constitutional rights of
children and then argued that the choice of whether to pursue a public
education beyond the eighth grade is a matter that concerns the child's
future, not the parents'. Thus, the child is likely to have "decided views"
on the subject. 58 Nevertheless, Douglas also acknowledged that parents
normally speak for the family. He thus distinguished choices that affect
only a child's future from those that affect the whole family. Likewise,
Supreme Court cases continue to "permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role" 5 9 in decisions concerning child rearing, in
50 Wald, supra note 13, at 992. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham
County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981). (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life long has been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest").
5' Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
52 See Foster and Freed, Child Custody (Pts. 1-2), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423, 615 at 423 (1964).
But since the care and protection process merely replaces the primary caretaker, even today children
have no assurance they will receive minimum levels of medical care and nurturance. See Areen,
supra note 30, at 892. See generally Tribe, supra note 41.
53 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
54 See Chemerinsky, Defining the "Best Interests": Constitutional Protections in Involuntary

Adoptions, 18 J. FAM. L. 79, 87 (1979-1980); Wald, supra note 13, at 986-987 & nn.10-11.
55 See Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 425-427.
56Mnookin, supra note 15, at 231.
57 406 U.S. 205, 241-249 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58 Id.

at 242-243.

59 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
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line with the traditional assumption that parents generally act in their
children's best interests. Naturally, these cases include some decisions
which could be characterized as involving only the child's future, since
society will not leave many of these decisions to the child's immature
preferences. 6o
The lack of consensus about the basic rights of children provides
one of the main bases for the disagreement over the standards for
neglect findings. It is unlikely that standards detailing the conditions believed to be necessary to the growth and development of
children into mature human beings, both physically and emotionally, will soon be established or recognized as legal rights. Indeed,
the imposition of such conditions as a matter of law in most instances would result in an unacceptable degree of state intrusion
into family life. 6 '

Whatever the proper balance should be, in abuse cases the parents
and child share an important interest in preventing undue state interven62
tion into their relationship.
3. State
Of course, the family is not completely protected from regulation.
Often parents do not provide an adequate home environment and the
health and safety of their children is placed in jeopardy. 6 3 "It is therefore
incumbent upon the state as sovereign to intrude, when necessary, to protect innocent individuals from undue harm caused by those who should
be their natural protectors."' 64
State concern for the welfare of children is not a new phenomenon.
The source of the state's power lies in the common law parens patrie
60

Id.

Areen, supra note 30, at 892-893.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, 764-768, 1400-1401 (1982). Moreover, greater respect for the legal rights of children need not imply a standard that diminishes the rights of parents.
We must first only allow each to assert the benefits they independently derive from the sanctity of
family autonomy. Thus parents may not defend against state intervention by putting forward the
harm to their children. Then, if we hesitate to vindicate independent children's rights, when doing
so would disrupt a basically harmonious family unit, we do so based at least partially on the fact that
destruction of this harmony hurts children as well as parents. A fortiori, when we are unsure
whether interference will further the rights of either, and when there is a tendency for the state to
interfere, creating the risk of irrevocable damage to the family unit, we maintain a need for a standard that concentrates on the family.
In New York, at the factfinding stage the state cannot assume the child and parent are adversaries
until parental unfitness has been established. At that point only the court may assume the interests
of the parent and child diverge.
63 See, eg., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S.
494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-235 (1972).
6 Phillips, supra note 10, at 853. See aLso Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, supra note
13, at 151; Wald, supra note 9, at 645-646.
61

62
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65
doctrine which makes the state the ultimate protector of child welfare.
At first this power only extended to orphaned and abandoned children, 66
but it eventually led to the development of juvenile courts and to the
formulation of statutes attempting to define when the state can intervene
67
between parent and child.
Yet, the child's interests must be separated from the interests of the
state, as the state's policies often conflict with the needs of individual
children. For instance, as long as the family structure is recognized as
providing the best method for rearing children, the state has political and
institutional reasons for supporting family autonomy. States also have
68
an interest in speed, efficiency and economy.
In areas where a strong consensus exists as to the child's best interest-such as in compulsory school education, 69 and child work practices 7 0-the courts have affirmed the setting of distinct limits on parental
authority as a legitimate exercise of state control. 71 But, the child protection area does not have a strong concensus or the precise definitions necessary to harness the power of state "agencies and courts to breach the
'72
states general commitment to family privacy and parental autonomy.
Thus, before attempting to define the proper scope of family autonomy it
is important to understand the effects of state intervention from a perspective of family serenity and child development.
When we hear of a child in need we have a natural inclination to
73
want to intervene, but we should not ignore the harms of intervention.
One problem is that to discover what is happening in the home requires
at least some investigation by an outsider; yet no consensus exists on the
65 See Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, supra note 13, at 172; Chemerinsky, supra note

54, at 85; Areen, supra note 30, at 893-894.
66 Lowry, The Judge v. The Social Worker: Can ArbitraryDecisionmaking be Tempered by the
Courts, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1037 (1977).
67 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 85.
68 Areen, supra note 30, at 893-894. A comparison of state and parental interests also shows
some that differ and some that are parallel, see generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765-766
(1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18,
27-28 (1981).
69 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 236 (1971); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
70 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Additionally, there exists "widespread consensus that children should be protected from more than death, severe physical harm or sexual assault."
Wald, supra note 9, at 629, and n.99.
71 Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23, at 160, n.3 (These interventions have been exercised
not only under the parens patrie doctrine but also as "reasonable and proper exercises of police
power" and as a "compelling state interest" in protecting the citizenry.)
72Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23, at 15. See also Mnookin, supra note 16, at 266.
73See Wald, supra note 9, at 689-690; Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23, at 133.
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harm caused by even minimal intervention. 74 Moreover, we have very
little data measuring the impact of various levels of intervention. 7 5 In

fact it seems that most authorities base their opinions on clinical data,
76
untested theories, faith, and personal values.
For the most part, those favoring intervention are people who work
with children, and base their views on their experience and their urge to
help children. 77 Much of the interventionist philosophy stems from altruistic desires to overcome poverty, 78 and the identification of the battered child syndrome 79 which led to increased publicity concerning the
amount and extent of abuse that occurs in our society.
Proponents of nonintervention are primarily from the academic
community. 80 They cite the failure of interventionists to weigh the consequences of disrupting the family. In Before the Best Interests of the
Child,8 ' Goldstein, Freud and Solnit make a persuasive argument for
minimal state intervention based on the state's inability to respond on an
individual basis to the complex developmental needs of children. They
also point out that the fact that some parents do not adequately care for
their children in no way suggests that the state has a better alternative.
Thus, intervention creates the risk of merely exacerbating an already bad
situation.

82

Many of the noninterventionists' concerns would be assuaged by
standards to control the arbitrary power currently given to state agencies 83 and courts. Arbitrary and coercive intervention diverts scarce resources away from those families that truly need help. 84 Also, improving
the accuracy of identifying abuse would reduce the incidence of harm
attendant to unnecessary intervention.
74 Many levels of intervention are available to the state ranging from informal investigations to
in-home guidance, from family counselling to removal of the child and adoption without consent.
75 Wald, supra note 9, at 690-691.
76 Id. at 691.
77 Id. at 659.

78 See Wald, supra note 13, at 986.
79 Id. at 986 & n.8. For a description of the battered child syndrome see V. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 14-15 (1973); Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemuller & Silver, The
Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
so Wald, supra note 9, at 659-660.
81 Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23.
82 Id. at 12-13. See also Wald, supra note 9, at 660-661 ("Numerous studies document that
children removed for their own good are frequently left in the limbo of foster homes, subject to
multiple placements and poor care. It is also well documented that many children are removed from
home unnecessarily, sometimes because the state does not offer services that would enable their
families to provide adequately without removal and sometimes where the state was wrong to believe
the child was endangered in the first place.")
83 Wald, supra note 9, at 690.
8 See McCathren, supra note 32, at 709.
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Michael Wald,8 5 also a noninterventionist, disagrees with the extreme view in Before the Best Interests of the Child. He points to the lack
of data supporting the claim in that book. Although he recognizes that
the costs and harms concomitant with intervention are real, he disagrees
with the view that intervention is always harmful, 86 especially less coercive intervention.8 7 Wald objects with particular zeal to the "elevation of
autonomy over intervention" in cases of physical abuse notwithstanding
the difficulty in drawing a line between discipline and abuse in a society
88
that condones corporal punishment.
Thus, the question of the derivative harms of intervention on family
life and child development remains as controversial as many of the other
areas of care and protection. We can safely assume, however, that intervention causes some harm. This fact should be kept in mind in formulating standards dictating the extent of intervention and autonomy.
We, therefore, have three factors to consider:
1) the traditional deference to family autonomy;
2) the need to intervene; and
3) the damage to an otherwise beneficial family life caused by
intervention.
Although most states and authorities have borrowed the best interests of the child standard from the private dispute/custody area, based
on the belief that the child's development depends significantly on the
nature of the home environment,8 9 the Supreme Court's latest statements
on the subject seem to require more. In Quillon v. Walcott,90 a unani85 See Wald, supra note 9.
86 For example, a growing body of literature indicates that intervention can be quite beneficial as
a corrective device, preventing future abuse and helping parents learn positive means of child rearing. Id. at 671.
87 Id. at 670 ("Although children rely heavily upon their parents and need to trust them, only
very young children are likely to see their parents as omnipotent. Older children, who spend hours
in school with teachers and peers, and still more hours in front of the television, certainly live in a
world where parental values and views are challenged. Children learn that parental authority is
limited by the school, by employers and by the state. There is no reason to believe that the impact of
this knowledge is 'invariably detrimental'.") Thus, intervention of some sort, short of removal, may
not be very harmful.
18 Id. at 673. Wald asks a rhetorial question about corporal punishment: "[C]an a society committed to family autonomy do anything but permit it?" Id.
89 See generally Wald, supra note 13, at 1003 ("A substantial body of theory and data supports
the hypothesis that a child's intellectual, physical, emotional, and social development is significantly
affected by his home environment. However, since each child may respond differently to a given
home environment, the law must focus primarily on the child rather than the parent or home
environment.").
- 434 U.S. 246 (1978). Quillon involved a due process challenge to a Georgia statute that denied unwed fathers the right to veto adoption of their illegitimate children. The Court ruled that
where the father had not attempted to legitimate or seek custody of the child prior to the proposed
adoption the best interests of the child standard was sufficient. A legitimate parent would receive the
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mous Court accepted the language in Justice Stewart's concurrance in
Smith v. Organizationof FosterFamiliesfor Equality and Reform 9 l which
called for a showing of parental unfitness in addition to satisfying the best
interests of the child standard. Furthermore, in Parham v. JR.,92 where
the Court upheld the right of parents to commit their child to an institution without a hearing, the opinion reaffirms, in very strong language, the
right of parents to decide what is in the best interests of their child without state agency or federal court review. The Court stated:
Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child
or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the
power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or
officer of the state. . . . The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic
surgery does not diminish the parents' authority to decide what is
93
best for the child.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio,94 the Court announced that it
would "examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation" when the government intrudes on family choices.
These cases go a long way towards permitting a good deal of leeway
in parental decisions. The Court has accepted the general presumption
that parents act in the best interests of their children, and has accorded
respect for the important place the family has in our culture and
tradition. 95
A few lower courts have gone further than the Supreme Court and
have found that "there is a fundamental 'right to family integrity' which
the state may abridge only by means narrowly drawn to further a com'9 6
pelling state interest."
parental unfitness standard. The distinction in extent of commitment to the child justified different
standards.
9, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("If a state were to attempt to force the
breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interests, I should have little doubt that the state would have intruded impermissible on 'the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter'."). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760
n.10 (1982).
92 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
93 Id. at 603-604.
94 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
95 The Supreme Court has commented that it "is through the family that we inculcate and pass
down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural". Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503-504 (1977). They see the family as an institution "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition". Id. at 503.
96 Note, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 15, at 722 (concluding that this standard is correct). See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777-779 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Alsager v. District Court,
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We are still left without an informed theory of family autonomy
from which we can deduce a reliable framework for care and protection
cases. One authority blames this incoherence partially on the judicial
method of merely announcing specific principles for each case and controversy confronted. 97 As a result, "over the past decade, the Supreme
Court's opinions concerning the conflicting rights of parents, children
and the state have failed, even by parsimonious standards of proper juristic method, to articulate a line of principle that justifies the Court's
decisions." 98
The salient question for us is what instruction we can elicit from the
constitutional framework to construct a fair and workable standard for
state intervention in cases of child neglect and abuse. Whether current
standards withstand constitutional attack is irrelevant for our immediate
purposes, since even if constitutionally legitimate these vague standards
have failed to establish a line between intervention and autonomy that is
readily applicable to individual cases. If we agree on anything it is that
the present rules are wholly inadequate. We must study the current system, including present laws and methods of adjudication to discover why
we are where we are and where improvements can be made.
As we proceed we should keep in mind the following:
Since our society values the principle of family autonomy and
privacy, we should carefully examine any decision to coercively
limit parental autonomy in raising children. We must define the
goals we seek to achieve by coercive intervention and the costs we
are willing to absorb in the process. In addition, we must ask
whether the resources exist, or can be developed, to make intervention into family affairs useful. 99
It is hoped that this analysis will provide not only an understanding of
our ambivalent feelings concerning autonomy and intervention but also
direction and guidance in fashioning a workable theory.
406 F. Supp. 10, 21 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aft'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). Alsager split the
Supreme Court cases into those based on liberty and those based on privacy: "The inescapable
conclusion arising from the foregoing authorities is that the Alsagers possess a fundamental 'liberty'
and 'privacy' interest in maintaining the integrity of their family unit." 406 F. Supp. at 16.
97 Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A JurisprudentialPerspective, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1980).
98 Id. at 3. Richards then attempts to do what the Court has not done through a philosophical
explication of the conflicting rights of children, parents and the state. He concludes that there is a
continuing appeal to Justice McReynolds' anti-platonic view in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401-402 (1923).
99 Wald, supra note 13, at 987.
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B. The CurrentStatutory Framework
Legal standards regulating the care and protection function must
identify and respect a line between state intervention and family autonomy. In response to the continuing political and moral debate over distribution of power between family and state, and philosophical
disagreement over the attributes of non-traditional family structures, 100
rules must be strict enough to safeguard against arbitrary state intervention by well-intentioned social workers yet flexible enough to respond to
the needs of children in danger. Transforming this intensely disputed
and fluid subject matter, into a succinct and functional doctrine is an
imposing task. Current state laws and other attempts to codify care and
protection standards 0 1 have not answered the challenge with success.
In response to growing public awareness most states have recently
enacted comprehensive care and protection statutes. 102 These statutes are
usually prefaced with a pronouncement of sacrosanct respect for family
life. 103 The question is whether the statutes uphold this ambitious goal.
Most statutes require abuse reporting and provide for protective
measures for children in need of help. The terms abuse and neglect,
however, remain vaguely defined. Some statutes focus on parental conduct while others focus on the needs of children.1°4 One authority 1 5
argues that laws focusing on a child's condition are more rational than
those concentrating on the parents' condition or on the parents' provision of their children's needs, since the former more clearly correspond
06
to the state's interest in protecting children.1
But even those statutes that turn on the best interests of the child are
normally so vaguely written10 7 that they fail to provide adequate guidance for determining when a child's condition calls for intervention. 108
As a result "children are often separated from their families on the basis
100 See Mnookin, supra note 15, at 265-266.
101 See National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect draft Model Child Protection Act, August
1977; Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect (tenth. ed. 1977).
102 Gordon, Child Maltreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches, 18 J. FAM. L. 115, 125
(1979-1980).
103 For example see New York Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(l)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977),
stating that "it is generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to the natural parent
because the child's need for a normal family life will usually best be met in the natural home, and
. . .parents are entitled to bring up their own children unless the best interests of the child would be
thereby endangered.").
104 For an excellent overview of the state statutes see Gordon, supra note 102, at 125-130.
105 Note, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 15.
106 Id. at 720-722. See also Wald, supra note 13, at 1000-1001.
107 Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 438; Chamberlain, supra note 31, at 1034.
108 Lowry, supra note 66, at 1034.
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of highly subjective and even biased judgments, frequently rooted in the
personal values of the caseworker or judge."10 9 Most statutes are broadened even further by their attempt to define emotional or psychological
abuse. 110
A statute must also delineate methods for ascertaining abuse. All
states require some "assessment of facts, values, physical and emotional
acts."' 1 ' Regulating child neglect is quite problematic, however, because
of the fine line between strict child rearing practices and improper acts.
Consequently many states define only a minimum level of parental duties
12
that must be met."
These broad and vague abuse and neglect standards are the inescapable result of the uncertainty and inconsistency pervading the care
and protection arena. First, the standards reflect the inexorable difficulty
in trying to regulate human relationships." 3 Second, the statutes have
broadened as prevailing attitudes have changed. 1 4 Recently, increased
attention to child development has stimulated a proportionate increase of
investigation into parental fitness, with corresponding broader standards.115 Moreover, whereas earlier writers advocated broader legislation and judicial intervention, a new wave of authorities are seeking more
6
definitive standards."
When we consider the effect broad standards have on family autonomy because of their tendency to perpetuate unguided volition by state
actors, we see the need for more specific standards. "For the child-protection function, legal standards define the circumstances that justify co109Id.
110 See Gordon, supra note 102, at 127. Cf Some states have attempted to define abuse very

specifically. For example Colorado defines abuse as existing in:
Any case in which a child exhibits evidence of skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition,
failure to thrive, bums, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling,
or death, and such condition or death is not justifiably explained, or where the history
given concerning such condition or death is at variance with the degree of type of such
condition or death, or circumstances indicate that such condition or death may not be
the product of an accidental occurrence.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-10-103(l)(a)(I). See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-2(3) (1977) (defining emotional abuse very specifically).
II Gordon, supra note 102, at 129. Physical abuse is easier to define than emotional neglect since
it usually have visible manifestations and the root of the parent's problem is more identifiable.
112 Id.

at 130.

13 See Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, supra note 13, at 183.
114 "The mode and history of legislative response to abuse and neglect was studied by Thomas,
who found it to be cyclical and greatly affected by the prevailing attitudes of the times. The nineteenth century punished; the twentieth century treats." Id. at 154.
115 Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 425-427.
116 See Wald, supra note 13, at 1001. Cf.Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, supra note 13,
at 173 ("Katz, however, argues for the necessity of general standards because the area demands a
maximum of judicial flexibility.")
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ercive governmental intervention into the family in particular. Here, the
use of indeterminate standards is unjust and unwise. It provides the state
with too much power to intervene into the family." ' 1 7 The policy towards strengthening and protecting family life adopted by many states
remains merely a platitude if not backed by adequate safeguards against
intrusion.
From the parents' perspective, the lack of definition subjects them to
the risk of losing their children for acts they may not have known to be
proscribed. Parents have no chance to conform to obscure standards.
They are denied fair warning.118
Broad standards thus enable state agencies to interfere where there
is no injury and no danger. 1 9 Since the system often fails to help the
children it purports to be protecting, many authorities have begun to
question the total reliance the drafters of the statutes place in welfare
agencies. 120 Under the current framework social workers can focus on
parental conduct without evaluating the impact that conduct has on the
children involved. 121 If we are to ensure that the system remove children
only when necessary, we must demand more specific statutes.
Imprecise standards also provide little guidance for judges, and promote unbridled discretion. 122 Perhaps the professionals who propogate
terms like "failure to thrive," "emotional health," and "best interests of
the child" understand them, but these terms have little practical meaning
for parents, lawyers, and judges. 123 Furthermore, courts often begin
without a very sophisticated conception of children's needs. 124 This realization led the Supreme Court to admit that "judges too may find it difficult in utilizing vague standards like 'the best interests of the child', to
avoid decisions resting on subjective values."' 125 Deciding cases in this
way does not comport with the judicial role.1 26 Present standards also
117 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 292.
118 Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 103; Mnookin, supra note 15, at 262-263.
119 Note, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 15, at 719-720; Wald, supra note 9, at 674.
120 Lowry, supra note 66, at 1038; Chamberlain, supra note 31, at 128 ("When a law provides

exceedingly broad definitions for abuse and neglect, it may itself become an instrument of abuse.")
121 Wald, supra note 13, at 1002-1003.
122 Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 626 ("imprecise standards inevitably create uncertainty,
unpredictability, and a lack of clear rules of how to guide judicial discretion.")
123 See Areen, supra note 30, at 927.
124

Id.

125 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36

(1977). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982) (1. permanent neglect proceedings
employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective
values of the judge. . . . In appraising the nature and quality of a complex series of encounters
among the agency, the parents, and the child, the court possesses unusual discretion to underweigh
probative facts that might favor the parent."
126 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 268. Implicitly we have shared assumption that the court's child
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encourage autocratic-type control. A judge can order removal merely
because she believes it is in the child's best interest to be somewhere else,
127
perhaps with a wealthier family in a better neighborhood.
Since it is rather unlikely that we can educate judges to the extent
that they could understand these vague terms, especially since psychologists probably cannot as yet supply us with implementable definitions, we
128
must devise more precise definitions.
Mnookin is the leader of proponents of specificity in rules that apply
to neglect and abuse decisions. 129 He developed his perspective from his
"research into the consequences of judicially wrought separation of children from their parents."' 30 Mnookin bases his criticisms on the subjectivity of current laws, their insensitivity to the pain suffered by parents
who lose their children, and the court's failure to critically question the
benefits of alternative placement as compared with the home. He points
to data that prove that foster care is often an inadequate alternative to
unstable home environments. Mnookin would, therefore, permit removal only as a last resort. He would further require the government to
seek a permanent resolution instead of leaving children in limbo in foster
care. The government should work to help parents prepare for the return of the child or, if that is not realistic within a reasonable time, to
31
allow adoption.'
Mnookin's theory emanates from a philosophy that eschews state
paternalism as an appropriate response in our constitutional framework.132 Because of our respect for family autonomy, we should require
a high burden of proof for state intervention.
[What has happened to children involved in the foster-care system-where the state has primary responsibility for this care of
some children-should give pause to those seeking broader state
protection function is to enforce minimum social standards, not to intervene coercively in an attempt
to do what is best or least detrimental. . . . But the legal standards themselves, by asking an indeterminate and inappropriate question, invite an overly ambitious and inappropriate response.
127 See also Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 88 ("Indeed, an 'extreme interpretation of the best
interests rule could lead to a redistribution of the entire minor population among the worthier members of the community'.").
128 Cf Areen, supra note 30, at 927 (suggesting that professionals should identify characteristics
that describe emotional injury and then use these definitions to prepare testimony).
129 See Mnookin, supra note 15. See also Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, supra note 13,
at 174-175. Wald has also been identified as a proponent of specificity although his position was
modified in his recent critique of Before the Best Interests of the Child, supra note 23. That book
adopts the strongest view, calling for intervention only in cases of clear physical abuse due to the
overwhelming tendency of judges, lawyers and social workers to impose their values on unwilling
parents.
130 Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, supra note 13, at 174.
131 Id.
132 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 266-267.
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authority. Indeed, even if one assumes that the family is simply a
convenient instrument for the exercise of state power, an understanding of limitations with regard to resources, official talent, and
what is known about human behavior is essential to the analysis of
33
the judicial role. 1
Precise standards not only control those who are all too willing to abuse
their power; they also inform those who genuinely desire to rule fairly.
If we are to maintain a sensitivity to the needs of children and thus,
families, it is clear that "intervention should only be permissible where
there is a clear-cut decision, openly and deliberately made by responsible
34
political parties, that the type of harm involved justifies intervention."',
And the inability of vague standards to provide refitted instruction to
judges and social workers mandates that we should attempt to formulate
more precise rules.
C. The Care and Protection Process
We have already seen how the pervasive arbitrariness in care and
protection systems evolves from the lack of definite standards. A thorough analysis of the process in action substantiates our initial observation
and reveals the adverse consequences of unfettered discretion in this
complex area.
1. Investigating and Monitoring Abuse Cases
Normally, a state welfare agency has the responsibility to investigate
suspected neglect and abuse cases that have been brought to its attention. 1 35 Social workers must decide whether to intervene at all and if so
36
what type of services to provide to the family and children.
Unfortunately the system responds less to the needs of the family
than it does to the reality that social workers do not have sufficient time
to help families very much. 137 It takes less time to break a family apart
than it does to keep it together. Furthermore, with the child out of the
home the social worker does not run the risk of parents seriously harming the child. Thus, more often than not the child is removed from his
home and placed in foster care or an institutional home.' 38
The merit of foster care, even as an alternative to an obviously
133 Id. at 267-268.

134 Wald, supra note 13, at 1002.
135See id. at 988 n.15; Gordon, supra note 102, at 131-132.
136 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 268.
137Id. at 273.

138Areen, supra note 30, at 928; Wald, supra note 9, at 663.
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harmful home situation, is a very controversial issue. 139 When the state
decides to place a child in foster care many questions arise. How long
will the child stay? What will be done to improve the home situation?
Will the child be returned to the natural parents? Do the benefits outweigh the scars left on the family relationships? If the child is not returned will he be put up for adoption? If yes, how soon? The answers to
these questions differ in theory and practice.
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and Reform, 14 ° Justice Brennan borrowed the Child Welfare League of
America's definition of foster care as "[a] child welfare service which
provides substitute family care for a planned period for a child when his
own family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended period, and
when adoption is neither desirable nor possible." While this definition
envisions foster care as a temporary solution, in actuality children usually move from one foster home to another 14 1 and stay in foster care for
142
long periods of time.
Since foster care is still, in theory, a temporary arrangement foster
14 3
families are admonished not to become too attached to the children. '
Additionally, since most children are moved from foster home to foster
home, they are never able to establish the continuity of relationships necessary for healthy development.'" Many studies show that these disruptions are seriously harmful to children. 145 Moreover, even if a child stays
in one foster home it might not provide a beneficial environment. Good
foster parents are difficult to find. Thus, many children spend a lot of
146
time in institutional type homes.
One reason children remain in foster care so long is that states rarely
139 See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
14 431 U.S. 816, 823 (1977).

141 Areen, supra note 30, at 914 (A 1963 study found that 28 percent of the children in foster care
had been moved three or more times, and a later study revealed that the average number of place-

ments for all children in foster care studied was 2.7); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 837 (1977) (record indicated that almost 60% of the children in

foster care in New York have had more than one placement and 28% had three or more).
142 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 273. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality &
Reform, 431 U.S. at 835, the court set forth the grim reality of the system at work: The District

Court found as a fact that the median time spent in foster care in New York as over four years.
Indeed, many children apparently remain in this "limbo" indefinitely. The District Court also found
that the longer a child remains in foster care, the more likely it is that he will never leave: "The
probability of a foster child being returned to his biological parents declined markedly after the first
year in foster care."

143 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 273.
I44 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-35
(1973); Mnookin, supra note 15, at 273 ("Thus, a large proportion of those entering the system grow
up without a permanent and secure home.")
145 See Areen, supra note 30, at 914; Lowry, supra note 66, at 1038.
146 Wald, supra note 13, at 994.
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attempt to rehabilitate the family. 147 Parents are not ordinarily offered
services of any kind and the state does not facilitate maintenance of the
48
family relationships. Thus, the family ties are broken.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit refer to the tendency to remove children followed by disregard of the family relationships as "the combina,,149
tion of too much and too little official action ....
Many authorities are calling for adoption in those cases where a
child is not likely to be returned within a given period of time.' 50 Adoption provides the stability lacking in foster care and irreparable home
environments. 151 But, the systemic focus on foster care as the appropriate remedy and the bureaucratic complexity of freeing children for adop152
tion precludes it as a viable alternative at this time.
Based on inadequacies in the foster care system, together with the
irrevocable damage caused by state intervention, many authorities question foster care as a substitute for even detrimental home environments.1 53 The argument suggests that state agencies, unrestrained
because of indeterminate standards, underestimate the risk of harm to
the child and family.1 54 "The use of indeterminate legal standards contributes substantially to this failure of the foster-care system because they
fail to require. . . the social-welfare bureaucracy to account for the children who have been removed from parental custody." 1 55
Removal of a child whether from "fit" or "unfit" parents severs important psychological ties, possibly causing greater damage than the benefits of substitute care. 156 First, the state cannot ensure a beneficial foster
147 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 273. Of course, even with rehabilitation return is often better if
done slowly so as to mend the parent/child relationship. So often social workers dump the child
back in the home and then it is a self-fulfilling prophecy when trouble occurs.
148

Lowry, supra note 66, at 1035-1037; Mnookin, supra note 15, at 273, n.208 (70% of the

parents in the study either had no relationship or an erratic or untrusting one with the agency. Often
agencies only work with the child.).

149 Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23, at 135.
150 See generally, Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23; Wald, supra note 9; Mnookin, supra
note 15. Presently, few children in foster care are adopted, even when return to the natural parents
is not a possibility. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
837 (1977).

151Mnookin, supra note 15, at 275-277.
152 Id. "The use of indeterminate legal standards contributes substantially to this failure of the
foster-care system because they fall to require. . . the social-welfare bureauracy to account for the
children who have been removed from parental custody."
153 See Note, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 15, at 722.
154 Bourne & Newberger, supra note 12, at 689.
155 Mnookin, supra n. 15 at 273. Mnookin presents a sobering account of the foster-care system in
operation.
156 See Wald, supra note 13, at 993-994; Areen, supra note 30, at 918 ("Current social science
evidence suggests that the separation of children from their parents can be harmful to the emotional
development of the children, whatever the faults of the parents.").
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care program.1 57 Second, the intact family, even if not harmonious, provides children with many developmental and psychological needs that
often are lacking in foster homes. 158 "[A] child is most apt to thrive in
the custody of those who have cared for him since birth. The bonds of
that relationship frequently cannot be fully duplicated by a court-ordered
substitute."' 159 Additionally, taking a child from a home and placing him
in foster care causes confusion and psychological problems. Children
often feel they are being punished and that they must respond to as many
as three sets of parent figures-the foster parents, the biological parents
and the social worker. These children suffer conflicts of loyalty and often
have severe identity problems.' 6°
Although no studies exist that compare similarly situated children,
those remaining in the home with those growing up in foster care, "a
number of studies show that children in foster care evidence substantial
emotional problems and have difficulty adjusting to school and peers.
The existing data must make one skeptical about relying on foster care as
16
a means of protecting children from neglect." '
In any event, "[floster care of children is a sensitive and emotionladen subject, and foster-care programs consequently stir strong controversy."1 62 Why then does the social welfare system rely so exclusively on
it as a remedy? Judith Areen presents one scenario:
The dangers of constant disruptions of care are well documented.
Consequently, it is difficult to understand the failure of agencies
that care for children to implement their espoused belief in the
beneficial effects of continuous family care. In the nineteenth century, institutions were known to be bad places for children, yet
they multiplied. Today the drawbacks of long term foster care and
multiple placements have been documented repeatedly, yet they
continue. This discouraging pattern of discrepancy between theory and practice in child care placements is so pervasive that the
cause must be inherent in the system. Perhaps, like an early Cruelty worker, the modern social worker who removes a child from
home subconsciously is incapable of later placing the child perma157Note, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra notes 15, at 722; Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note
23, at 13 (by intervening the state may make a bad situation worse, or a tolerable one bad).
15SGoldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23, at 13; Wald, supra note 13, at 995.
159Bourne & Newberger, supra note 12, at 671.
160 Wald, supra note 13, at 995.
161 Id. at 995-996. But cf Wald, supra note 9, at 668 (claiming that the evidence on foster care is
all one-sided and that it is far from clear that children fare worse in foster care). Wald agrees,
however, that removal prior to adjudication should only be allowed in cases of extreme physical
abuse. Since many allegations are unfounded the assumption that it is better to err on the side of
removal "overlooks removal's incalculable harm to children". He would, instead, adopt less intrusive means of intervention. Id. at 662.
162 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1977).
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63

Other authorities are less forgiving. Wald, although he combats Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit on almost all other fronts, agrees that one of the
strongest arguments for limited intervention speaks to the competence of
those administering the system. 164 Judith Chamberlain goes even further, condemning a system that permits a child placed in temporary care
to remain there, as suffering "bureaucratic negligence and indifference
"165

At least part of the problem must be attributed to the institutional
demands of the social worker's job. Resources are negligible and case
loads extremely high. 166 "Thus, a social worker's task is a frustrating
one with many dead ends for the client. In the few hours that are available for face-to-face contact with families, social workers can only respond to crises and work intermittently with one or two cases in which
improvement seems possible."' 16 7 As a result of these conditions, the
turnover rate for social workers is high, which consequently has grave
68
effects on the stability of the foster-care system.'
More than any other factor, however, the wholesale grant of power
permitted by indeterminate standards is responsible for the systems
failure.
The use of an indeterminate standard means that state officials
may decide on the basis of unarticulated (perhaps even unconscious) predictions and preferences that could be questioned if expressed. Because of the scope of discretion under such a standard,
there is a substantial risk that decisions will be made on the basis
69
of values not widely shared in our society, even among judges.'
The discretion granted to state agencies allows them to impose their values, standards of parenting, and personal prejudices on families. 70 As a
result "'protective custody' has become an instrument of coercion aimed
capriciously at various members---or segments-of society. .... ,,17.
163 Areen, supra note 30, at 914.

164 Wald, supra note 9, at 661. Wald also cites lack of funds, civil service requirements, and the
difficulty in attracting professionals to work in public agencies and juvenile courts as adding to the
poor implementation of the system.

165Chamberlain, supra note 31, at 128.
166See McCathren, supra note 32, at 717-718.
167Id. at 718-719.

168See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 837
(1977).
169Mnookin, supra note 15, at 263.
170See Lowry, supra note 66, at 1034; Chamberlain, supra note 31, at 128 (stating that a social
worker will use her power to punish parents for acts felt to be immoral).
171Chamberlain, supra note 31, at 123.
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The Supreme Court has commented on this phenomenon in discussing
why some parents "voluntarily" place their children in foster care:
The extent to which supposedly "voluntary" placements are in
fact voluntary has been questioned on other grounds as well. For
example, it has been said that many "voluntary" placements are in
fact coerced by threat of neglect proceedings and are not in fact
voluntary in the sense of the product of an informed consent.
Studies also suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds, perhaps unconsciously, incline to favor continued placement in foster care with a generally higher-status family rather
than return the child to his natural family, thus reflecting a bias
that treats the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial
to the best interests of the child. This accounts, it has been said,
for the hostility of agencies to the efforts of natural parents to ob1 72
tain the return of their children.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that services and other alternative
resolutions are available, the predilection towards foster care is reinforced by social, cultural and class bias, as well as by institutionallyimposed bias such as risk-avoidance and efficiency. The impact on families is devastating.
2. Adjudication
Deciding who shall have custody of a child is one of the most heartrending decisions a judge must confront. Often the judge must choose
among several unattractive alternatives by deciding which one will expose the child to the least harm,, 17 3 a prediction for which the judge has
no special expertise.1 74 Nevertheless, judges must choose.
Given the inherent indeterminacy and the realization that severing
the family relationships may irrevocably harm the innocent child, one
would expect judges to require various remedial attempts prior to removal. The result of most neglect adjudications, however, is separation
172Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 834-835
(1977) (citations omitted). In a footnote the court added the following observation:
Other factors alleged to bias agencies in favor of retention in foster care are the lack of
sufficient staff to provide social work services needed by the natural parents to resolve
their problems and prepare for return of the child; policies of many agencies to discourage involvement of the natural parents in the care of the child while in foster care; and
systems of foster-care funding that encourage agencies to keep the child in foster care.
[Citations omitted]
Id. at 834 n.35.
173 Litwack, Gerber & Fenster, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J.
FAM. L. 269, 269-271 (1979-1980).
174 See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 113.
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of parent and child. 175
Under the best interests of the child standard, judicial discretion has
its widest application, since the rule does not state a preference for any
choice. 176 A study of judicial reasoning under this standard reveals that
"courts consider criteria which, although useful, are inadequate, in that
they fail to force courts to consider essential factual, social, medical, and
psychological information. Consequently a judge may have nothing but
his common sense to guide him to a wise solution of a complex problem." ' 177 It is, however, grossly naive to assume that a judge's common
sense will lead to wise solutions in controversies so riddled with
uncertainty.
Mnookin employs the model of rational choice to illustrate how foreign the matter of deciding a child's best interests in a particular case is
from the judge's usual responsibilities. 178 Rational decision making involves identification of the various outcomes and then choosing the one
that maximizes utility. In care and protection adjudication, under the
best interests principle, the judge cannot accomplish either task. To calculate the utility of various custody alternatives the judge would need
substantial information and predictive ability, and a system for measuring the utility to the child. 179 First, the judge usually does not know
where the child will be placed if taken from the home, and also does not
know how removal will affect the parent/child relationship. Moreover,
we have already seen the disagreement among experts as to the benefits
of foster care as an alternative to even a bad home environment. Thus,
the judge is confronted with measuring the utility of unknowns. 180 Second, since there is no accord on what constitutes proper child rearing,
the judge does not know what values to consider in determining the
child's best interests, except those developed through the judge's own
experiences. These experiences were most likely dissimilar to those of
the people being judged. Neither the statute nor society's views (since
there is no consensus) informs the choice. Finally, the judge has no way
of knowing whether to give short-term or long-term considerations more
weight, as she has no way of predicting how long an individual child will
require foster care nor how well the child will fare in that setting. Also,
175

Areen, supra note 30, at 887, 928 (claiming that the predilection for removal arises from fear

of publicity if a child is returned and harmed or cognizance of the insufficiency of available resources
to adequately protect children).
176 See Finlay, JudicialDiscretion in Familyand Other Litigation, 2 MONASH U.L. REv. 221, 233
(1976).
'7
Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 438.
178Mnookin, supra note 15, at 255-256.
179 Id.
180 See notes 152-160 supra and accompanying text.
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meeting what appear to be short-term needs does not always comport
1 81
with long-term development.
Judges are, therefore, ill-equipped to determine the appropriate
course under a vague standard-such as the best interests of the child.
Since a judge's decisions must accommodate the uncertainty of predictions and the complexity of human development and personal relation18 3
ships, 18 2 personal bias is likely to take over.

Perhaps court review of abuse cases contemplates a judicial curb on
arbitrary social worker action.184 Judges, however, are no less suscepti185
ble to the impulse to intervene on behalf of relatively helpless children.
Lacking the ability to base their decisions on sound predictive information and being accountable to no one, their decisions often reflect an imposition of their personal values and child rearing beliefs. 186 Moreover,
because parents involved in unfitness proceedings are usually poor, uneducated and/or minorities, "such proceedings are often vulnerable to
judgments based on cultural or class bias"'187 even by the most well-intentioned judges.'a

8

Many courts have responded to the ad hoc nature of case-by-case
decisionmaking by implementing judicially created standards for removal.' 89 For example, the best interests standard has received a narrow
construction in many jurisdictions with many courts refusing to remove a
child without a showing of parental unfitness.' 90
In Massachusetts, for example, both traditional tests-"best interests of the child" and "parental unfitness"-have been employed. For a
long time the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) equivocated
about which standard to apply.' 9' Then, in 1975, it attempted to clarify
18sSee Mnookin, supra note 15, at 255-262, 270-272.
182 The Supreme Court has recognized that "courts must move with great circumspection" in
situations in which they are 'ill-equipped' to understand the intricacies of the needs. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-235 (1972). "[A]n instruction whose excessive generality tends to overwhelm the limitations of human judgment is inevitably 'given more passing mention than real
effect'."
183 See Bourne & Newberger, supra note 12, at 684.
184 This, at least, is the purpose of the American Bar Association proposed standards, note 146
supra. In fact standards similar to the ABA proposed standards, implemented in New York, resulted in children moving out of foster care faster. Lowry, supra note 66, at 1049.
185Wald, supra note 13, at 987.
186 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 103-104; Wald, supra note 13, at 1001-1002;
Mnookin, supra note 15, at 269.
187 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
188 See Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23, at 17; Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 103;
Mnookin, supra note 15, at 269.
189 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 262.
190 See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 80-81. The Supreme Court has suggested that best inter-

ests of the child is not enough. See notes 133-139 supra and accompanying text.
191See Phillips, supra note 12, at 864. The indeterminacy resulting from both standards is exem-
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its position:
The mother perceives the two criteria or tests as separate and distinct with each to be applied in certain clearly defined circumstances. We think that the relationship is more subtle, that
elements of parental "unfitness" figure strongly in the "best interests" test, while elements of "best interests of the child" weigh in
any consideration of whether a parent is fit to have custody of his

child. 192
The court further stated, "the tests are not separate and distinct but cog1 93
nate and connected."
Since 1975 the SJC has attempted to expound on the interrelationship of the two standards. In Custody of a Minor,1 94 the court indicated
that the unfitness standard would not be subsumed into the best interests
principle. Removal must be predicated on a detailed showing of present
parental unfitness. 195 On the other hand the court also clearly stated that
its primary concern lies with the child's present and future. 96 Finally, it
stated, "we are persuaded that it is constitutionally demanded that a
judge exercise the utmost care, as demonstrated through specific and detailed findings of fact, in rendering a judgment which deprives parents of
197
child custody."'
In Benzio v. Patenaude,19 8 the SJC affirmed the two tiered test, stating that neither standard should be applied to the exclusion of the other,
and also that "the Commonwealth may not attempt to force the break up
of a natural family without an affirmative showing of parental unfitness." 99 Yet, the court also explained that the two tests are "cognate
and connected" in that they "reflect different degrees of emphasis on the
same factors". 2° ° Finally the court recognized the weight necessarily ac20 1
corded the judge's opportunity to observe the parties first-hand.
It is hard to imagine a more convoluted standard to apply. The SJC
seems to have come full circle. Such rhetoric accompanied by deference
plified by attempts to define them. For instance in Massachusetts "unparental traits" have been
defined as including moral delinquency, violent temper, indifference or vacillation of feeling toward
the child, or inability or indisposition to control the child. Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 552,
180 N.E. 508, 510 (1932).

192 Petition of the New England Home For Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 636-637, 328
N.E.2d 854, 858 (1975).
193 Id. at 641, 328 N.E.2d at 860.
194 377 Mass. 876, 389 N.E.2d 68 (1979).
195 Id. at 882, 389 N.E.2d at 73.

196 Id. at 883, 389 N.E.2d at 73.
197 Id. at 887, 389 N.E.2d at 70.
198 381 Mass.
199 Id. at 570,
20 Id. at 577,
-o1 Id. at 579,

563,
410
410
410

410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980).
N.E.2d at 1211.
N.E.2d at 1215.
N.E.2d at 1216.
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to the trial judge's discretion amounts to an assertion of platitudes, and
does not promote the sensitive inquiry that the situation necessitates.
To overcome their inability to evaluate the intrinsic complexities in
care and protection adjudication, many judges rely on expert testimony. 20 2 Psychiatrists have only a rudimentary understanding of the
care and protection problems, however, and many authorities have attacked the unreliability and invalidity of psychiatric judgments. 20 3 Until
we have better information on the effects of different environments on
child development, psychiatric testimony will enable judges to avoid the
on
difficult issues in hard cases by perfunctorily grounding their decisions
2 °4
intrusions.
prejudicial
justifying
the expert's conclusion, thereby
Adversarial adjudication, traditionally responding to an act-oriented
legal world, does not adapt well to the delicate issues involved in care
and protection. 20 5 In our litigious society, legal policy often reflects the
character of the system rather than the needs of children. 20 6 Thus, a
child's need for a quick decision in order to protect the continuity of his
family relationships, bows to time delays, and strict litigation standards,
which inhibit our ability to understand the complexity of the human
wants and needs. Extra-legal services are foregone for the sake of an
adversarial hearing that pits parents against child and increases the likelihood that the child will be called on to testify. 20 7 These pressures exacerbate the child's emotional stability during an already confusing period.
The legal system also frustrates the state's ability to rescue a truly
needy child. 20 8 Social workers are often reluctant to go to court because
of their unfamiliarity with and relative vulnerability in this forum. Thus
they may respond more to their apprehension of attending court than to
2°9
the needs of their clients.
As we have seen, the case law has not clarified the indeterminate
statutes.2 10 Care and protection decisions are rarely appealed, and when
202 See Litwack, Gerber & Fenster, supra note 174, at 272-273; Gordon, supra note 102, at 132-

133; Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 439.
203 Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
204 See Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REV.

1117 (1976); McCathren, supra note 32, at 708 ("Strict legal standards and accountability mechanisms must replace reliance upon the unrestrained judgment of professionals and that deference
should not be accorded to professionals solely because their intentions are good"); In Re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1966) (refusing to defer to professional discretion and the laudable goals stated).
205 Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 627; Gordon, supra note 102, at 142.
206 See Wald, supra note 9, at 679.
207 Id. at 679, 687.
208 Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, supra note 13, at 182.
209 See id. at 181-182 (need for judges and attorneys to understand "social and emotional dynamics" and for social workers to understand "legal procedures"); Gordon, supra note 102, at 142.
210 Areen, supra note 30, at 920; Bourne & Newberger, supra note 12, at 684-685.
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they are the appellate court usually sustains the trial judge.211 Thus, appellate review offers minimal control over the biases of trial judges, and
the lack of judicially imposed standards denigrates the principle that like
2 12
cases be decided alike.
The inefficacy of the courts in care and protection cases stems from
three distinct factors. First, the adversarial system of justice does not
supply an adequate framework for understanding the complexities of interpersonal relationships. Second, indeterminate legal standards fail to
supply judges with guidance and direction. Third, appellate courts have
failed to derive intermediate rules as "subsidiary guides" 2 13 for trial
judges.
When one reviews a number of recent cases involving custody
awards, the conclusion becomes inescapable that as a group they
are marked by question begging, rigid rules, and platitudes which
unfortunately tend to inhibit careful inquiry and thorough evaluation. It is a matter of grave concern that in an area of such great
human and social importance courts are failing to lay down rules
.214
sufficiently precise for meaningful guidance ...
In addition, even if judges could make fully informed initial decisions,
they are generally unable to supervise the case on a continuing basis so
they rarely review the consequences of their decisions. 2 15
Precise standards would not ameliorate the problem. For example,
they would be virtually ineffective if the courts could not administer
2 16
them because of crowded dockets, or other institutional problems.
Moreover, they would not alter the nature of the inquiry into interpersonal relationships as opposed to objective acts. This remains a medium
in which judges are unfamiliar and uncomfortable. Still strict standards
would help to clarify society's interests 2 17 and would also facilitate appellate review.
D. Suggestion for a Better System
"The current system-both in allowing the state broad discretion to
determine when removal is appropriate and in permitting the child's
needs to be disregarded on removal-simply does not reflect society's
expanding respect for personal autonomy or increasing knowledge of
211See notes 190-202 supra and accompanying text.
212 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 263. See also Bourne & Newberger, supra note 12, at 684-685.
213 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 262.
214 Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 427.
215 Wald, supra note 9, at 662.
216 Lowry, supra note 66, at 1048-1049.
217 Wald, supra n.9, at 1004.
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child development. ' 21 8 The tendency for social workers and other professionals to intervene prematurely, ostensibly in the best interests of the
child, calls for a counterbalancing force. Perhaps we should enjoin all
family intervention "unless specially justified to the satisfaction of a suspicious arbiter". 21 9 Another option is stricter rules.
Mnookin, Wald, and the authors of Before the Best Interests of the
Child all opt for more determinate rules. 220 Since a legal rule must reflect value choices and determinate ends, however, I cannot see how
these authors can overcome the fundamental uncertainties in care and
protection today. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit attempt to solve this problem by limiting intervention to cases of severe physical abuse. This eliminates choosing in the face of indeterminacy but in an inadequate way, as
it ignores the needs of children subject to abuse less severe than broken
bones and cigarette burns.
Thus, we confront what appears to be a Catch 22 situation. In attempting to meet the needs of children we become stuck in a quagmire of
uncertainty. Yet, when we try to eliminate uncertainty through determinate rules we may overcome systemic inefficiency but we do so at the
expense of children's needs because we lack a consensus on what values
should serve as the rudiments for building a system of rules. Without a
foundation the structure falls. Until there is more data on the psychological impact of intervention and removal on children and family relationships, determinate rules will not produce principled decisions.
Procedural safeguards are an appealing interim solution. For instance, social workers could be required to obtain a court order to remove a child. Before the court would even hear a removal case, the
social workers (except in cases of extreme physical abuse) would first be
required to try and remedy the problem through various services to the
family. Additionally, to counterbalance the state's overwhelming advantage at the adjudication stage, the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a burden of proof less than clear and convincing evidence in
221
parental termination proceedings.
Two attendant issues must also be resolved. First, some authorities
believe that even the above level of intrusion is harmful. 222 While this
may be true it is surely less detrimental to everyone involved than removal of a child.22 3 It also ensures rehabilitation and consequently
218

Lowry, supra note 66, at 1037.

219 Tribe, supra note 41, at 9.
220 See Wald, supra note 13, at 1004-1040; Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 23, at 136;
Mnookin, supra note 15, at 264 (rejecting procedural safeguards in favor of more determinate rules).
221Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764-767 (1982).
222See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
223Not only would it be less intrusive but it would cost less in the long run. Under the present
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should be of shorter duration than foster care. Second, less intrusive
forms of intervention, more easily justified, will likely be employed more
frequently. To reduce intrusion in cases of unsubstantiated claims of
abuse, intervention to provide services should be limited to situations
where removal would be contemplated under the present system. This
does not answer the threshold question of when intervention, at any
level, should be allowed, but it restricts the level of intervention until we
have obtained the knowledge to formulate a rational system of determinate rules.
III
According to the traditional view of statutory adjudication judges
are rule appliers. Rule making, the subtle process of weighing inherently
subjective individual values in order to generate the compromises necessary to maintain order and personal freedom, is strictly a legislative function. Judges should merely apply the ultimate rule objectively to
224
particular fact situations.
Unfortunately, this formal model of adjudication does not always
work. At times the law does not effect its intended goal simply because
the rulemakers cannot accurately predict the future, 225 and sometimes
old rules no longer generate outcomes consistent with evolving moral
consensus. In both cases the rule should be changed. In other situations
rules do not work at all. For example, Martha Minow presents a compelling argument for rejecting rules in private custody disputes, thereby
enabling the judge to force the parties to reveal their true personalities
instead of allowing them to conform to a standard that is not helpful in
2 26
situations where personal attitudes rather than acts are the talisman.
system parents rarely receive rehabilitative assistance and foster care lasts a long time. Providing
services, while possibly more expensive on a day-to-day basis, should not last as long since it rehabilitates and also discovers those situations in which help is not necessary.
224 Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 358-364, 389 (1973).
225 Id.
at 380.
226 Minow, supra note 21. Minow's article suggests a method for resolving the uncertainty
caused by the fact that child custody adjudication turns on an evaluation of personalities, by rejecting rules in order to keep the parties from planning ahead and conforming to pre-existing standards. She would also give the judge unrestricted power because it is only by succumbing to the
judge's power that the parties' true personalities become manifest. Even if Minow's system works in
private-dispute-custody cases it cannot be generalized to other areas, especially where there is state
intrusion on constitutional rights. In private custody disputes the court intervenes because the parties need someone else to make the decision, but in the child abuse area, where the state is seeking to
remove a child from the home, there is the additional element of state intervention in the constitutionally protected family sphere. For the differences between private dispute custody, and care and
protection, see Mnookin, supra note 15, at 265 ("Legal standards for private dispute settlement, on
the other hand, neither allocate power between the family and the state nor regulate a bureaucracy
responsible for the primary care of children. Instead, the evaluation of private-dispute-settlemeni
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Any theory that rejects rules in favor of adjudication by less determinate standards must concurrently contemplate the implications such a
change has on judicial discretion. Simply because rules have lost their
efficacy in a particular setting does not mean that wholesale grants of
discretion to judges will provide an adequate solution. For instance, even
if judges are allowed to refuse to enforce laws based on archaic and unacceptable notions of human interaction, this does not consequently give
them license to create ad hoc dialogue toward the establishment of new
laws based either on their own personal views or their perception of the
prevailing societal consensus.
The foregoing discussion of the present care and protection process
was intended to increase sensitivity to the consequences of unchecked
judicial power in this area. It is important to be made aware of the issues
in the care and protection process because of the profound disagreement
over what values should comprise a method for choosing among alternatives and what outcomes ensue from any given choice. Two recent theories of judicial method, found in StructuralDue Process,227 by Laurence
Tribe, and in Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication22 and
Legal Formality,229 by Duncan Kennedy, espouse greater freedom for
judges when rules no longer effect acceptable outcomes, either because
society's views have changed or are substantially inaccurate. In both
situations, the reason for analyzing the judicial role is that uncertainty
and confusion exist when social values change.
The purpose of this section is to analyze these theories of judicial
activism in light of what was learned in studying the care and protection
system and also to examine how they help us solve some of the problems
we left unanswered. What is the judge's role in the face of uncertainty of
professional opinion and indeterminacy of legal rules?
A. Judges as Rule Appliers in a Changing World
Rules are directives of the sovereign, strictly defined and attaching
determinate consequences to identifiable factual situations.230 "At the
opposite pole from a formally realizable rule is a standard or principle or
standards centers on how fairly and efficiently they guide authoritative judicial resolution of a dispute private individuals were unable to decide for themselves.")
227Tribe, supra note 6. This theory also appears in Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications,and
Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, supra note 41; Tribe, From EnvironmentalFoundations to ConstitutionalStructures: Learning From Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975).
228 Kennedy, supra note 6.
229 Kennedy, supra note 225.

230 For various formulations of this definition see generally Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and
Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1960); Friedman, supra note 5, at 751; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1687-1688.
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policy. A standard refers directly to one of the substantive objectives of
the legal order. Some examples are good faith, due care, fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness. ' 23 1 Another example is best interests of the child.
According to Kennedy's thesis the traditional model of adjudication
chooses rules because they restrain official arbitrariness and ensure certainty. In other words, rules act to curb ulterior motives that do not
reflect "the underlying purposes of the rule. '2 32 Furthermore, strict
rules delimit judicial intervention, thus preserving a sphere of autonomy
for private citizens. 233 Standards, on the other hand, enable judges to
234
participate in rulemaking and fail to proscribe judicial discretion.
Rules are thus an expression of power allocation in the political system.2 35 In this system the legislature creates rules as a balance of each
individual's values and wants, 236 and judges must apply rules mechanically to preserve the legislative compromise and respect individual's need
for advance planning. 237 According to the theory, when a judge lets notions of equity affect her decision she is not promoting the general welfare of society since certainty is destroyed. 23 8 Rather, applying the rules
objectively promotes fairness and justice through uniformity.
Implementing per se legal rules, without exception, has its cost. The
failure of the judicial system to respond to exceptional circumstances en239
genders imprecision in the form of over- and under-inclusiveness.
Proponents of rules, however, point to the advance notice given by formal rules and blame the individual for not planning ahead. 24° In fact,
assessing the merits of any given rule is a misguided enterprise since each
rule is merely a stitch in the fabric of compromises negotiated by the
legislature. Speaking to individual justice precludes attaining overall
maximization of social utility. Thus, a certain amount of irrationality is
231Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1688.
232Id. at 1688. See also Pound, supra n.231, at 926-927.
233See Freidman, supra note 5, at 752; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1707 n.62; Kennedy, supra note
225, at 36-37.
234Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1690, 1752.
235 Friedman, supra note 5, at 755.
236Kennedy, supra n.225, at 362.
237Id. at 374, 357-358 ("Legal formality is a characteristic of any legal system that can be described in the following way: (a) the purpose of the system is to serve the conflicting ends of a
legitimately representative lawmaker; (b) a substantively rational law-making process produces a
body of rules designed to achieve these ends; (c) rule appliers apply the rules to cases presented to
them by disputing private parties. . . . The essence of rule application

mechanical.").
238Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1689, 1739.
239 Id.
240Id.

. . . is that it is
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inherent in this system. 24 1 The duty to submit to the rules is, therefore,
not determined by their content. It derives ultimately from the legitimacy of the whole compromise rather than from that of the particular
command.

' 242

If a participant feels that a rule is inherently unjust, the proper
243
course is to try to change it through the legislature.
In Legal Formality, Kennedy rejects the formal model of adjudication because of an incipient flaw-the compromises that become rules are
based on a rigid view of a changing world. 244 Rule making takes place in
uncertainty as it relies on predictions about the situations in which rules
will be applied; but whereas the world is fluid, rules are inflexible. Over
time "the world comes finally to bear little or no resemblance to that
anticipated, ' 245 and rules become archaic. Furthermore, people do not
immediately realize the gap between rules' intended goals and their actual effect. Since people accept irrationality as part of the human condition, they are able to rationalize unjust rules as products of that
246
condition.
Since rulemaking involves very complex negotiation and compromise, legislative response is slow. Meanwhile, "[e]ach formal application
of the rules takes the litigant and the rest of society farther and farther
through forfrom the situation within which he thought he had secured,
24 7
mality, the position formality is now denying him."
Formality ultimately fails because of the moral dilemma in which it
places the judge: "The judge cannot claim that legislative acquiescence
legitimizes his action because he himself creates, through his decision of
particular cases, the situation from which will emerge an as yet indeterminate constellation of legislative power. ' 248 As an actor in the system
that created the original compromise, the judge cannot ignore a litigant's
request for him to justify his decision as a citizen. 249 When a judge realizes that enforcing the rule "overthrows" rather than "executes" the intended purpose, and the litigant claims she is not merely being
"sacrificed" but "exploited" "[t]he judge must take responsibility for deciding whether that possibility has become actual in the particular case
241 Kennedy, supra note 225, at 369-370, 378, 380.
Id. at 369.
243 Id. at 369-370.
2" Id. at 380-382.
245 Id. at 381.
246 Id. at 382.
247 Id. at 384.
242

248 Id. at 385 (emphasis omitted).
249Id. at 385-39 1. If the legislature responded immediately the judge's dilemma would not occur. When rules no longer effect desired outcomes, the balance of power becomes tilted and we run
the risk that those with power will be able to block legislative change.
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before him."'250
Whatever response we choose to replace a model of formal rules,
will provide judges with greater discretion. The traditional response to
those areas of law where formulation of rules is problematic because of
uncertainty or lack of a sophisticated understanding of the consequences
of applying rules is as follows:
[The law] confers upon courts a discretion in the matter of adjudication. Such a conferral of discretion may be expressed to be at
large. More commonly, it will be made subject to certain conditions or considerations, or so as to give effect to certain kinds of
results or to be governed by certain principles. But it will always
confer upon the judge powers in which greater or less scope is
given to him to apply views and judgments that may be said, in
some measure, to be his own. For example, to quote Pound... :
"inproceedings for custody of children where compelling consideration cannot be reduced to rules, judicial determination must be
left, to no small extent to the disciplined, but no less personal feelings of the judge

. ..

251

In applying standards, judges must first ascertain the particular facts and
then analyze them in light of values or purposes. 252 This second step is
that of judicial discretion. Whether the judge derives the purposes and
morals from her own personal views or those of society depends on how
much the legislature has left to the judge's considered judgment. 25 3 The
argument for discretion stems from the perspective of an increasingly
complex and ever-changing world. In this view, life's complicated
problems cannot be reduced to mechanically applied rules. Rather, judi254
cial decision-making must be left to the discretion of the judge.
What is wrong with this approach? Discretion should not automatically follow from the conclusion that certain fact patterns are complex
and formulation of rules is difficult. Rather, uncertainty should be a
starting point, a fact that exists, candidly admitted, 25 5 and from which
we analyze the usefulness of discretion as opposed to rules or some other
form of restraint.
Opponents of judicial discretion object to the risk of leaving impor250

Id. at 391.

Finlay, supra note 177, at 223-224, quoting Pound, supra note 231, at 929.
See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1688; Friedman, supra note 5, at 754.
253See Pound, supra note 231, at 926, 929, 931.
254 Id. at 925, 927-928. Of course, there is a difference between granting discretion to disregard
rules in extreme situations and allowing judges to have a free hand over an entire area of law simply
because indeterminacy makes it difficult to formulate rules. The discussion in this article has no
bearing on discretion in extreme cases.
255 See Mnookin, supra note 15, at 230.
251
252
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tant decisions to the whim or caprice of a single person. 25 6 Where judicial lawmaking takes place only in the interstices of the law or at times
2 57
when a consensus exists it is not controversial.
But there are also situations in which there is great conflict. The
judge is then faced with a dilemma: to impose his personal views
may bring on accusations that he is acting "politically" rather
than "judicially". He can respond to this with legalistic mumbo
jumbo, that is, by appealing to the concepts and pretending that
they have decided the case for him. Or he can take the 25risks
inher8
ent in acknowledging the full extent of his discretion.
Any theory that grants judges legislative power must set some constraints on it. When we do grant judges lawmaking authority, however,
we have to decide whether to employ rules or principles to guide judges
as to when they can reject rule application in favor of law-making.
Therefore, we have not solved the basic problem we discovered in formality but have merely postponed confronting it.259 For this reason
Kennedy chooses a system that minimizes judicial lawmaking. He asserts that legislatures enact "intelligible purposes" along with each law.
Judges act intersticially, when necessary, to uphold this legislative purpose. 26° Under this theory when a judge cannot morally enforce an ex261
isting law she can rule without making new law.

In care and protection cases, the best interests of the child represents
legislative purpose, and our inability to understand and determine a
child's best interests has inhibited effectuation of that goal. Kennedy's
theory is appealing since it makes the intuitive leap of switching blame
from judges to legislatures for failing to announce "intelligible purposes."
It is therefore incumbant upon the legislature to derive goals that judges
256 For example, consider the following statement by Lord Camden:
The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; It is always unknown; It is different in
different men; It is Casual and depends upon Constitution, temper, and passion. In the
best it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly and passion to which
human nature is liable.
Pound, supra note 231, at 926.
25 See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1732, 1760.
258 Id. at 1132.
259 See Kennedy, supra note 225, at 392-393. Kennedy considers three theories to replace formality. He rejects two. First, a doctrine he calls neo-positivism, recognizes that judges have some
legislative power. This simply moves the problem of judicial discretion one step further back since
the neo-positivist must decide whether this legislative power should be bounded by rules or standards. In fact neo-positivists recognize entire areas that necessitate ad hoc judicial discretion. Family law is one because of the "conflicting and confused social interests" presented by different cases.
The second doctrine allows judges to weigh the value of certainty against social goals in each case.
This is more subjective and limitless than neo-positivism.
260 Id.
261 Id.

at 395-396.
at 398.
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can identify and achieve when strict rules are not suitable. General mandates are not acceptable because they result in wholesale discretion and
lawmaking. When neither strict rules nor "intelligible purposes" are
available, Kennedy's theory implicitly suggests some form of legislatively
imposed judicial restraint. He quotes Pollock and Maitland:
"[D]iscretionary powers can only be safely entrusted to judges whose impartiality is above suspicion and whose every act is exposed to public and
professional criticism. '262 Ad hoc decisions grounded on the best interests principle are not "exposed to public and professional criticism".
Thus, I have suggested procedural safeguards as an interim solution until
better rules and/or principles are formed.
Discretion is generally not appropriate in custody adjudication
under the best interests principle, because of a judge's inability to predict
the consequences of her choice. First, "judicial discretion in these cases
in actual practice is often a 'hit and miss affair', based ultimately on a
judge's 'own idiosyncratic conceptions and modes of thought'. ' 263 Second, judges are ill-equipped to determine the psychological factors involved. 264 Allowing judges to perform some sort of controlled discretion
in abuse and neglect cases is certainly not out of the question, however.
It is hard to imagine this field ever being reduced to strict rules since so
much turns on an analysis of personalities. The problem, then, is finding
a way to make judges accountable. Perhaps a standard like that in alimony law in Massachusetts would work. 265 In that scheme the judge is
given an exclusive list of factors to consider in deciding property division
and alimony. Moreover, judges must submit detailed findings of fact.
This facilitates appellate review and holds judges accountable. Nevertheless judges maintain considerable discretion in fashioning alimony judgments in that they decide how much weight to accord each factor. 266
Moreover, class and social prejudice mitigate the attractiveness of any
system that allows discretion in care and protection cases, so we must
discover ways to preclude consideration of these factors, and other factors that have been the source of judicial abuse in this area, before we can
find the best balance between strict rules and limited discretion. 267
262Id. at 391, quoting F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law ch. 9, § 1, at 561 (lst ed.
1895).
263 See Finlay, supra note 177, at 240.
264Id. See notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
265 See Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 208, Section 34.
266See Langerman v. Langerman, 9 Mass. App. 869, 401 N.E.2d 163 (1980).
267There are other areas, not mentioned, where rules do not work well. For instance, rules
cannot be mechanically applied where there are gaps or when two rules conflict. Also, some areas
are meant to be left to judicial interpretation. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131134 (1977) (terms like "equal protection of the laws" are concepts left to the judgment of the court).

1985]

CHILD ABUSE

B. Judges as Discoverers of Consensus in Times of Moral Flux
We leave the realm of formality having identified the source of the
problem-the legislature's failure or inability to devise rules or intelligible purposes for judges to apply. In the alternative judicial discretion
fails because it is uninformed and unrestrained; it is thus unable to assuage our fear of state domination in abuse and neglect cases.
Professor Tribe's theory in StructuralDue Process,268 and its companion articles, 269 grows out of a series of Supreme Court cases invalidating irrebutable presumptions that force judges to ignore central issues in
adjudicating important rights. 270 An irrebutable presumption is the
quintessential formal rule 27 1 that allows no leeway for the interpreter to
adjudicate claims that strict application will generate undesirable results
because of a shifting consensus. 272 As we have already observed, as time
273
passes values change and laws no longer effect desired outcomes.
When this occurs the problem is not that a hearing provides inadequate
procedures for discovering whether a person really meets the presump274
tion, but that the presumption itself is not a valid determinant.
The concern for misapplication of out-dated rules is intensified
when, as in the case of intervention into the family, the decision "implicates both a set of interests about whose importance there is very broad
social agreement, and a set of values and understandings about which
27 5
there is the deepest disagreement and flux".
Judicial intervention to remedy this situation may seem inappropriate since we would expect the political system to respond 276 and rewrite
the law. Indeed, conditions of moral flux are most likely to give rise to
active participation in democratic processes by the electorate. However,
several structural barriers inhibit change. First, strict enforcement of the
old rule blocks transition to a new consensus because the restricted acts
remain alien to our consciousness. 2 77 Second, in some cases "normal
processes of legislative accommodation to changing values [will] not
268 Tribe, supra note 6.
269 See note 228 supra.

270 See Tribe, supra note 41, at 10 n.9, for an excellent summary of these cases.
271See Friedman, supra note 5, at 753 (the rule in Shelly's case is the classic example).
272 See Kennedy, supra note 225, at 379.
273See also Tribe, supra note 6, at 298-299.
274 For example, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), unwed fathers were automatically
deemed unfit to care for their children. Mr. Stanley successfully argued, not that the hearing deprived him of proving he was not an unwed father, but that being an unwed father was not sufficient
grounds for concluding he was unfit. Tribe, supra note 41, at 18.
275Tribe, supra note 6, at 302.
276 Id. at 303.
277For example, never allowing unwed fathers to have custody of their children precludes our
discerning that it can work. Tribe, supra note 6, at 316.
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function adequately. ' 27 For instance, in Roe v. Wade,279 religious issues
interfered with recognition of changing values. 28 0 Third, it is hard to
mount support against an unenforced rule.2 1

Finally, rapid change can

cause an exceedingly disproportionate shift in distribution of power, enabling those who benefit to block change. 28 2 In any of these situations it
would be unfair to force a litigant to take her claim "to a legislature
28 3
everyone knows to be inaccessible".
In the irrebutable presumption cases this problem was resolved by
ordering individual hearings on the merits of the asserted claim. 2 4 Professor Tribe claims that these cases suggest ad hoc hearings, unbounded
by rules, in situations which implicate rights held to be fundamental and
values about which there is profound disagreement and flux. 28 5 Resolu-

tion of these cases through irrebutable rules-of-thumb, even if a less restrictive alternative than the rule invalidated, preempts the dialogue
2
necessary for the evolution of a new consensus.

6

This approach reveals the essence of the problem in abuse and neglect cases. Assume an irrebutable presumption that any single parent
hospitalized for manic-depressive mental illness is unfit. Ignoring how
difficult it is to prove manic-depressive mental illness, a father deprived
of his child by this statute would not argue that he was provided inadequate procedures for proving that the rule did not apply to him, but that
the rule used an unreasonable criterion for presuming his unfitness.
Family integrity is a fundamental right and there is wide disagreement as
to proper child-rearing techniques. Moreover, the nature of the flux precludes using determinate, albeit less restrictive, rules. 28 7 The father
would argue for an individual assessment of his fitness, claiming that
278

Id.

at 317.

279 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

Tribe, supra note 6, at 317.
Id. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a clearly out-dated statute (prohibiting
contraception) remained because it was not enforced and no one challenged it.
282 See note 246 supra and accompanying text.
283 Kennedy, supra note 225, at 379.
284 Tribe, supra note 6, at 286 n.52.
285 Id. at 382. Tribe also admits that some cases must be decided by rules, that the need for rules
is sometimes of constitutional proportions. Tribe, supra note 41, at 15. He also mentions that
Mnookin has urged the use of rules, under the best interests principle, out of fundamental fairness to
children. See Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973).
As I see it the problem is our present inability to create workable rules and so Tribe's theory informs
this analysis since it provides an alternative to rules.
286 Tribe, supra note 6, at 301; Tribe, supra note 41, at 25. Duncan Kennedy offers the same
thought from a different perspective: "Standards may even be accepted into the predominant conception of how a rule system works, treated as an area of 'inchoacy' or of 'emerging rules', as though
altruist justice were inevitably the prelude to a higher stage of individualism." Kennedy, supra note
6, at 1777.
287 See notes 221-222 supra and accompanying text.
280
281
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"[a]rbitrary rules are no substitute for careful inquiry and a thorough
'288
evaluation of the facts.
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of this scheme, Professor Tribe
may be placing too high a premium on the value of fully discretionary
hearings. Although "[r]ule-of-thumb decisionmaking in such circumstances is intrinsically unjust in that it denies the individual a responsive
explanation of the exercise of state authority over her, ' 28 9 our unrefined
predictive ability regarding child development, and the existence of intense disagreement concerning child rearing norms, preclude giving
judges the information necessary to decide those cases in an ad hoc setting. 290 Nor can the judge articulate "some coherent principle for the
29 1
decision reached".
Even if these additional uncertainties did not exist we would have to
question whether procedural due process and reasoned elaboration 292 requirements could delimit judicial discretion. Judicial activism must always be questioned. Even if we assume that there is a coherent
consensus emanating from each person's self-motivated and arbitrary
values, 293 and that rules should reflect consensus, from their detached
political position judges often lack the expertise to discern popular sentiment. 294 And even if judges were privy to such information we have no
guarantee that they would be influenced by society's desires.
In Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court,295 Thomas Grey maintains that recent cases concerning sex, marriage and the family do not
reflect Supreme Court recognition of a fundamental right to sexual freedom but rather show that the Court is "dedicated to the cause of social
stability through the reinforcement of traditional institutions .... -296
He sees the Court begrudgingly acknowledging established practices in
order to preserve social stability. 297 For example, fornication statutes
will eventually fall to the practical recognition of thousands of couples
living out-of-wedlock. Homosexuality laws will be abolished because of
the need to regulate a group that "is becoming an increasingly public
sector of our society". 298 This is not a Court sensitive to moral flux, or
288Foster & Freed, supra note 52, at 441.
289Tribe, supra note 6, at 307.
290Id. at 307-308. Thus, it is the indeterminacy that exists in care and protection, over and above
moral flux, that creates problems here.
291 Id. at 308.
292

Id.

293See Kennedy, supra note 225, at 363.
294 See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
295 Grey, supra note 5.
296 Id. at 88.
297 See id.at 97.
298 Id.
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willing to respond to an evolving consensus, but one that merely recognizes realities, when it becomes absolutely necessary. A more skeptical
view would see the Court using moral flux as an excuse for stalling; acting only when flux becomes a solid majority.
Jarrett v. Jarrett299 provides a striking example of the harm caused

by judges given freedom to discover evolving norms. In that case a
mother, upon divorce, was given custody of her three children. When
her boyfriend moved in with her, her ex-husband brought an action to
transfer custody. The Illinois supreme Court found that the mother's
violation of the Illinois fornication statute created a conclusive presumption that she was harming her children's best interests.
The fornication statute had rarely, if ever, been enforced .3° Moreover, it had no direct connection with custody. Thus, the state court, not
the state legislature, used an irrebutable presumption to interfere with a
fundamental right (family autonomy) for actions (sexual relations with
someone not your spouse when there are children in the house) about
which there is intense disagreement and moral flux.
Instead of requiring a hearing on the merits, the court rekindled a
dying criminal law by giving it newly found pertinence. Judges, supposedly competent to protect us against unjustified presumptive treatment,
did exactly the opposite in this case by subjecting Ms. Jarrett to a conclusive rule-of-thumb.
Another argument against open dialogue in the courtroom during
times of changing political and moral attitudes about fundamental values
states that this is precisely the time when clear lines are needed. Without
strict demarcations, discretionary interim decisions that do not coincide
with the ultimate consensus violate human rights.30 ' Heymann and
Holtz assert this view 30 2 in their discussion of euthanasia for the severely
30 3
defective newborn.
299 449 U.S. 927 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
300 Id. at 331.
301 In other words, during periods of change different segments of society will support different

outcomes. Assume the disagreement involves a choice between X and Y. If left to judicial discretion
some will get X and some will get Y. If society eventually agrees on X those who got Y in the
interim will have been denied fair treatment. The argument claims that the cost of this error during

change is too high.
302 See Heymann & Holtz, The Severely Defective Newborn: The Dilemma and the Decision Pro-

cess, 23 Pua. POL'Y 381 (1975).
303All the prerequisites for structural due process analysis are here. The choice implicates a
fundamental right (life) in an area of moral dilemma (when it is difficult to determine the infant's
interest to be kept alive but the costs to the family are clear "a basic sympathy for all the parties
involved, strongly urges withholding treatment in this situation. It appears callous to allow abstractions and general principles to dictate actions which are likely to increase, in extremely concrete and
predictable ways, the total of human happiness." But, "that a person is defined once and for all at
birth and that one identified person's life should not be knowingly sacrificed for less than the life of
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A sense of security and acceptance, which underlies the very concepts of rights and self-respect and which is a precondition of
human happiness, depends upon knowing when one or a member
of one's family is a fully protected member of the community. Society should be, and is, prepared to pay a great price to define
personhood with considerable clarity. Neither doctors nor parents
nor courts nor even legislatures should be entrusted with discretionary decisions as to whose life can be taken with impunity. Re34
cent history is too full of examples of abuse of that discretion. 0
It seems that those willing to rely on judges to mold the future have high
regard for the judiciary's knowledge and determination to work justice.
But, no matter how well-intentioned and sensitive judges are, if they lack
the expertise to understand the consequences of their decisions, as is the
case in abuse and neglect proceedings, 30 5 blind obeisance to their personal wisdom is misguided. It also gives the legislature false security. If
legislators believe that existing standards are adequate, they will not invest their time and resources toward finding a solution.
We remain, therefore, caught between rules that are too rigid and
unguided discretion that does not ensure reasoned decisions. We must
weigh flexibility against the risk of judges imposing personal values and
biases instead of upholding fundamental rights. Perhaps discretion
bounded by intelligible purposes provides the right compromise. Or
maybe someday we will have a consensus on child rearing and the predictive ability to formulate strict rules. Informed decisions will not be
made until we have more than an elementary understanding of the consequences of the various living arrangements on children, which will only
come with better research. Until then, it seems that procedural requirements provide at least some stability to the care and protection process.
An implicit goal of Professor Tribe's structural due process theory is
to create a system with the capacity to elicit fundamental values from
dialogue among the interested parties. In the same way that processbased constitutional theories 30 6 rely on a smoothly functioning democratic system, structural due process relies on such an open and healthy
dialogue guided by judges with open-ended discretion. As I have attempted to show, however, this judicial power is a corrupting force, so
that bias and prejudice often prevail over respect and concern for basic
others" is also a deeply held belief). Id. at 414-415. Moreover, broadly held ethical views of this
nature, as in Roe v. Wade, supra note 231, make legislative action doubtful.
304Heymann & Holtz, supra note 363, at 411.
is whether we can make the
305 See Mnookin, supra note 15, at 293 ("The underlying issue ...
of help. These decisions
children"
in
need
identify
those
necessary
to
refined sort of judgments
cannot be made on an individualized basis.).
306See, e.g., Ely, supra note 295.
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human needs. Fundamental values are identified only when they are externally imposed; they will not evolve out of this process.
IV
The approach in this article has been contextual and normative.
Such an approach requires the defining of the subject which implies making the choice of a perspective, with a concomitant narrowing of the universe affected. If one's vision becomes too telescopic then any ideas that
ensue will be so precise and rigid that they will be virtually useless in a
changing world.
In the context of care and protection, certain values are generally
accepted. For example, society has a limited view of what constitutes a
family, and we also see the family as a sanctuary not to be entered by
government30 7 unless a child is in danger. Structurally, we work within a
system that includes parents, children, social workers and judges.
What about homosexual marriages? What about children's rights
not to be dominated by parents? Why not neighborhood councils that
decide who is allowed to raise children? What about perfectly fit parents
implementing novel child-rearing techniques?
Since I am not trying to develop a theory of first principles, but
rather am testing particular theories in a concrete setting where people's
lives hang in the balance, it follows that as long as the norms employed
respect change-so that new values can evolve and inform the processsuch complex and controversial issues do not arise. It is only when a
system locks us into a set of beliefs that we must worry about inhibiting
change. In attempting to develop ontological principles such as individualism and altruism it was important for Professor Kennedy to ask what
we want in a neutral way.30 8 Since I have been attempting to find practi-

cal solutions to an immediate problem, I have had to accept certain views
of the world but I have attempted to rely only on fairly settled principles
and not restrictive definitions.
In other words, my acceptance of the idea that intervention into the
family should be limited stems from psychological evidence that the family structure is usually beneficial to a child's development and that intrusion destroys continuity. But, I have not limited the definition of family.
Any family structure that can provide for a child's development deserves
recognition.
If society changes-as may very well happen as child care becomes
307 See notes 36-50 supra and accompanying text. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651

(1977).
308 See Kennedy, supra note 6.
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more prevalent-and the importance of a fairly immune family unit decreases, these assumptions will change. But until that happens, interference with relatively harmonious families is likely to be detrimental to
child development.
Parental domination of children remains a pervasive problem especially since the Supreme Court has employed the family autonomy rhetoric, developed to protect children, to restrict children's rights. In H.L. v.
Matheson,30 9 the Court cited the constitutionally protected relationship
between parent and child in requiring a fifteen-year old to inform her
parents before having an abortion. This, of course, turns the entire doctrine of family autonomy on its head. This issue, however, is only peripherally related to finding a standard for care and protection. When a
child outgrows the need for family protection that child should not be
subject to parental domination. Our care and protection system should
certainly incorporate this principle. Before a child reaches that age, however, parental choices normally provide the stability necessary for
healthy development. "A system based on parental autonomy does not
require agreement about the characteristics desired in children, the
proper type of home environment, or the correct way to raise children.
Instead it requires agreement about basic harms from which we wish to
protect all children." 3 10 Likewise, parental autonomy is facilitated until
the child reaches a certain age because parents generally provide children
with the nurturing necessary to develop to the point where they can
make their own decisions. When parental autonomy becomes parental
domination to the extent that it prevents a child from reaching this stage
of development, then the state must intervene. Our goal is to enable children to reach the age of independence in a way that gives them the opportunity to participate in society. 31 I Because of unsettled views on child
rearing and the importance of continuous psychological relationships, we
believe that this is best accomplished by not interfering with the family.
309 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981).

310 Wald, supra note 13, at 993.

311Ackerman's thesis supports this view. A very young child depends on his parents to provide a
model of behavior. Neutral dialogue allows parents to impress children with things they feel are
important. "During primary education, the child has not yet mastered the cultural skills necessary
for his own participation in liberal dialogue. Thus, the question of legitimacy can only be asked by
other adults. During secondary education, the child can raise the question of legitimacy. This fact
• . .transforms the kinds of coercion that are justifiable in the name of liberal education." Any
child rearing technique that gives a child the minimum cultural coherence needed to develop the
ability to participate in neutral dialogue is sufficient. Since the potential for overreaching is obvious,
state bureaucrats must be restricted to intervening only in "the most egregious cases". As a child
grows and begins to question the legitimacy of parental authority the parent's power to control and
guide the child erodes. Finally the child reaches the stage where he has attained enough experience
to define his own conspeiton of the good. At this point the child gains independence. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 139-154 (1980).
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The care and protection system must recognize that there comes a
time when children have the right to independence. Moreover, it should
not restrict the definition of the family. Nevertheless, we must not elevate these altruistic goals over present realities as children have a right to
be protected. Childhood is special and only if we protect children's needs
during this fragile stage will they be able to live fruitful lives. Consider
Alyosha's final words in The Brothers Karamazov:
There is nothing higher and stronger and more wholesome and
good for life in the future than some good memory, especially a
memory of childhood, of home. People talk to you a great deal
about your education, but some good, sacred memory, preserved
from childhood, is perhaps the best education. If a man carries
many such memories with him into life, he is safe to the end of his
days, and if only one good memory remains, in our hearts, even
312
that may sometime be the means of saving us.
In society today the family normally provides children with the guidance
and love they need, better than does any alternative living arrangement.
Intervention into the family generally harms development, and our care
and protection system must respond to this manifest reality.
312
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(emphasis added).

